6/30/01

Hi Aurino,

73. You probably have nearly given up on me. Sorry it has taken me so long to respond to your last letter. Things have been so busy for me that I have had only brief, unplanned chunks of time available to do any writing. I have been able to dash off some rather trivial responses to the counterbalance forum, which you may have seen, but a proper response to your last letter requires more time for careful thought than I have been able to find. I hope that I will have the time to finish this response today.

74. There might be a benefit in this delay, however. I think my response might be more meaningful writing today than it would have been a month ago. The reason is that I think I have learned something important about myself in the interim that bears on our communication. I guess I had better explain what I mean.

75. I am a naturally shy person and reluctant to express my opinions unless I am sure someone is interested in them. This makes me a rather boring or awkward person in some social situations. I typically don't start conversations, and if someone starts one with me, one of two things usually happens: If the subject is football, or any other commonly discussed subject in which I have no interest, the conversation fizzles because I have no interest or ability to keep it going, or, if the subject is something I am interested in, and I think the other person is genuinely interested in my opinions, I will go into the subject with more vigor and depth than the person wanted and they are soon looking for some way to escape from me.

76. That characterization of me might be more of a caricature, but I just wanted to set the stage. What has happened to me and my ideas as a result of this personality trait is that the ideas in my head seem to build up pressure and seem to want to be expressed. To help relieve the pressure, I wrote essays and built a web site which you visited some time ago. Then I discovered the counterbalance forum which bled off some of the rest of that pressure.

77. True to my nature, I was hesitant to express myself at first, but after getting my feet wet, I opened up and let out most of my ideas. The whole time, I tried to assess other people's opinions and impressions of what I wrote. It was clear that the fundamentalists rejected my ideas out of hand and if they debated me, they used what I consider to be illogical arguments. Kathy and Sasha were the prime examples and I finally ended up choosing not to converse with them any longer.

78. There were people like you, Franz, Lars, and Nick who seemed to be on my wavelength, but when it came right down to trying to express exactly what we agreed on, it usually seemed to devolve into a disagreement over some unimportant detail.

79. Then there were what I considered to be the "real" scientists, like Luis and V.V. Raman. But I found that I couldn't keep them engaged. As soon as things got a little speculative, they simply dropped out.

80. Finally, there was Harv. He was persistent and seemed to have an open mind along with an opinion on virtually everything, but I never felt I could communicate with him. I don't think he ever really understood anything I wrote, and I always had difficulty understanding what he wrote. I just don't have enough formal education in philosophy to understand the meanings behind the words he uses. As a result, my communications with him also fizzled out.

81. Boy, I sure didn't mean to drag this description out so long, but I wanted you to understand the context behind two very important recent changes to my own view of the world. The first was the new view of the elephant provided by Dick Stafford and his work, and the second was a real surprise provided by Josh in my most recent counterbalance conversation.

82. Dick gave me two new ideas that have had a major impact on my thinking: 1) that the laws of physics can be derived from the mathematics of numbers, and 2) that 'describability' is equivalent to 'expressibility in numbers'. I'll go into these a little later, but first, in case you haven't been reading counterbalance, I'll summarize what I learned from Josh.

83. I had only a brief, hand-grenade-like conversation with Josh. He questioned what he called my "god concept". From the way he expressed his challenge, I thought he was a fundamentalist. He cleared that up on his second post when he declared that he was an atheist. He considered me to be a theist, which I guess is fair.

84. He said he was only interested in logical arguments and he seemed to be logical in what he wrote, so I felt that here was a guy with whom I could have a good logical discussion. I figured we would each lay out our logical positions and we would each question the other guy where we didn't see the logic in his argument. But I must have been blind.

85. After only a couple of exchanges, when I thought we were just getting into a position to make some headway, the hand grenade exploded. He abruptly told me that I was completely illogical, impossible to communicate with, and that everything of mine he had read in other posts was nonsensical. Or words to that effect. He said that he refused to communicate with me any further.

86. Well, this threw me for a loop. Up until then, I thought I was pretty logical and a fair communicator, but this made me re-examine my self and my opinion of myself. I could see myself through the eyes of at least one other person, and I looked ridiculous, illogical, bull-headed, opinionated, and goofy.

87. So now, after having this new insight into myself, and after the insights provided by Dick, let me sketch out in general how I see all this fitting into our discussion. Oh, one more thing. I have been reading "Mind and Nature" by Gregory Bateson (which I would highly recommend) and he has articulated some of these same ideas very lucidly. I'm not sure whether he did such a great job, or whether I am just more receptive after the new insights I just mentioned, but the timing was perfect. This is an old book (1979), which I stumbled across at a garage sale, and it fits in exactly where my thinking is at this very moment. It is one of Harv's "synchronicity" events.

88. As I see it now, there are two basic concepts that I think are at the root of the subject we are discussing. They both have to do with the notion of 'reality'. Of course there is no satisfactory, universally agreed-upon definition of 'reality', but what I mean by the term is the most inclusive connotation possible. I would say that 'reality' includes everything anyone has ever considered to be part of 'reality'. I am not interested in debates over whether or not, for example, the past, or the future, or the platonic world of ideas, are 'real'. I say, include them all. If they are 'real', (whatever that means), then they belong in there. If they are not 'real', then I haven't really included anything extra, since they don't exist anyway. I don't want to get hung up on the definition. I just want to convey that I am talking about the biggest possible set of things that might conceivably be 'real' or that might 'exist' or 'be'.

89. The first of the two concepts, then, is that there is this thing we call 'consciousness' that is part of reality, so we can conceptually divide reality into two 'subsets': consciousness and everything else.

90. The second concept is that some of the things in reality can be described in symbolic language. We believe that to be the case because we have fairly extensive languages in which we ostensibly describe myriad things. These descriptions seem to work well for our human purposes, so there seems to be little doubt that some things can really be described. But that leaves the logical possibility open that there may be other things in reality which cannot be described in language. So, we again have two subsets: the 'describable', and the 'indescribable'.

91. Now, to extend that second concept a little further, Dick has explained that to be describable in language is exactly equivalent to being expressible in numbers. To me, that is a powerful observation. It means that if reality consists of two subsets, viz. the "describable" and the "indescribable", then it is the "describable" and only the "describable" which must obey the laws of physics. That means that the "physical world" is describable and must of necessity obey the laws of physics. It also means that the "indescribable" subset doesn't necessarily have to obey the laws of physics, but more importantly, it is impossible to adequately (or correctly or completely or unambiguously) describe anything in this subset of reality in language.

92. Now, if we merge these two concepts (89 and 90 above) with the aid of a Venn diagram, the 64-thousand-dollar question pops right out: Is consciousness, or part of it, indescribable or is it entirely describable?

93. I have come to the conclusion that some part of consciousness is indescribable. As I see it, reality consists of two domains: the physical, which is all describable, and the non-physical, which is indescribable and which includes the conscious experience. I guess you could say that I am a bona fide, card-carrying dualist. Here are some of my reasons for coming to this conclusion:

94. Science has been inexorably describing more and more of our universe for the past thousand years or more. Looking at the trend, it looks to some people like it is just a matter of time before science will describe everything there is. That is the position atheists take - that god is simply the gap in our ability to describe the universe, and that gap is narrowing and will soon close up leaving no room for god. I, on the other hand, believe that consciousness will be the last holdout and that science will not ever be able to describe it. It is only an opinion, but it is based on my own assessment of the progress science has made to date toward explaining my conscious experience.

95. The second reason is that in Dick's work, he as much as admits that the things he calls the 'subconscious' and his own 'conscious thoughts' are outside of his set of numbers which he defines as reality. I haven't exactly pinned him down on this position, and he might disagree with the way I worded it, but in face-to-face conversations with him, I think I have gotten him to agree with me. (One of the tasks I have set for myself is to get this idea captured in written language that Dick will agree with. I hope I can get it done fairly soon.)

96. Now, that was a long, drawn out preamble to my comments on your letter, and I hope I didn't lose you. But I think it was necessary in order for you to understand what I am getting at with my comments on your ideas. Here goes.

97. You started out by saying that "What I'm trying to get at is the nature of consciousness." Since that is exactly what I am trying to get at, I think we are at least starting from the same point.

98. (37) (The numbers in parentheses refer to your paragraph numbers. I won't repeat what you wrote by quoting it. That should make this letter a little shorter, but you should probably have a copy of your letter handy while you read mine.) You introduced the notions of knowledge and discovery. I think those are key notions. If I had to put my finger on the essence of consciousness, I would say that it is the capacity to know. It is this ability which I believe is indescribable. Even though they can't describe what it is, I think any conscious person "knows" what I am talking about. When I say "I know what green looks like to me", people understand what I am talking about. And, I think they would agree that, 1) I do indeed know what green looks like to me, and 2) neither I nor anyone else can describe in words what green looks like to me.

99. Your second notion, discovery, implies a movement or transfer of knowledge. That is, discovery is some knowledge that becomes available to, or "moves into", some consciousness. Where did it come from? Well, it either arose from nothing as completely new knowledge, or it came from somewhere outside of consciousness. I'd say that both kinds probably happen. Completely new thoughts might be imagined, or thoughts might result from knowledge being presented to consciousness from other parts of reality. In the second case, the parts might be describable, or they might be indescribable.

100. So, I think I agree with you (37) that nothing new can be discovered. I would say that nothing new about physical, or describable, reality can be discovered. That knowledge simply moves from one locus of consciousness to another. But I think new indescribable concepts can arise and be discovered. These are second order effects. Bateson makes a big deal about them. They are things like Moire patterns that arise from the interference between simpler patterns. It is the novelty arising from re-combining DNA. It is the deep implications of mathematical theorems arising from the much simpler axioms. Etc.

101. (38) Thanks for your vote of confidence in my ability to catch on to what you are saying, but I'm not sure it is deserved. The way I see it, you are exactly correct. I think the big source of confusion is our ability to "know" some things about "indescribable reality" and yet being unable to describe them in language. Our thinking process, as you say, is one such example.

102. (39) When it comes to the physical world, I agree with everything you wrote in this paragraph. And, you might be right that any discussions about anything non-physical is a waste of time. But, then again, it might not be a waste of time. After all, it sure is fun.

103. (40-43) Thanks for clarifying that. I agree completely.

104. (44-45) I think I understand the principles you are getting at with your water tank analogy. I would quibble with the analogy itself, since I don't think it would work as you describe, but that would distract us from the main discussion. (Your requirement that each tank is associated with a single valve would either require a network of connecting pipes which would have no controls, or else the topology of the network would be one or more disjoint rings. Neither of these networks would behave as you describe. Also, since there is no energy supplied to the system, e.g. pumps or inflow of water, the system would stabilize after the water had reached the same level in all tanks and no further action would occur.)

105. (46-51) Your analogy sounds like the current scientific approach to how mental functions arise from the signaling patterns within the network of neurons. I think this explanation has a lot of merit. I'm sure it accounts for a significant portion of what we call mentality. There isn't much doubt that our mind is a "learning" system and that at various stages, functions are clumped, or abstracted as you suggest. And, no doubt, some of this learning is captured in physical re-configurations. If one were to design a computer program to mimic human mentality, I think this would be a promising approach. But,...I think that even if such a system could be built, and even if it could mimic human behavior, it would still be missing the component of conscious experience. I think that the system you describe could, in principle, achieve any describable result or behavior, but I also think that there are indescribable functions or aspects of mentality which cannot be implemented in a purely physical system. And that is precisely where I part company with the scientific explanation of the world.

106. (52) Your example makes sense to me, although I am not sure it makes sense to me in the same way it does to you. I suspect there may be a major difference in our concepts of exactly "who" we are talking about when we say "our minds". As I tried to explain in my old essays, I think the nature of identity is the most profound mystery there is, that is, the nature of the "thing" that has a mind and experiences consciousness. The common perception is that each individual human has a mind and an identity that is continuous over the individual's lifetime. I don't think that is necessarily the case - either the continuity or the one-to-one correspondence with human bodies. I don't mean to digress from the current train of ideas, but I just wanted to point out that our ideas might be quite different at this point.

107. In your paragraph, 52, when you use the pronouns 'our' and 'we', I think you mean either each of us as an individual human-with-a-brain, or you mean the collection of such humans. I agree with what you said as long as those pronouns are interpreted to include other, non-physical, possessors of mentality and consciousness as well. I don't have much of an idea as to what those others might be, but I think there is at least one such, and possibly many more. But since I also think they are not describable, maybe it doesn't even make sense to count them so the very idea of there being one or more than one may be meaningless.

108. (53) I would agree with this paragraph if you changed "reality" to "our perception of reality". I think it is the perception that is the abstraction, not reality itself. But in making this change, I have thrown that pronoun "our" back into the mix. You can't even have perception without a perceiver and that opens the question back up that I raised in my paragraph 106. Who exactly is this perceiver? I think the answer is unknown, probably very complex, and maybe even indescribable. Now, if you had said "physical reality is an abstraction", then I would also agree. But in this case, the mind that holds the description, or abstraction, of physical reality is definitely not a human mind nor any collection of them. Instead, it would be some non-physical mind about which we know next to nothing. My whole point is that I think there are two different types of minds to consider: human minds, and some non-physical mind which I say is the creator of physical reality which includes human brains. Now the connection between this non-physical mind and what seem to be "our" human minds tied to these physical brains, I think is a great mystery which may well be inexplicable.

109. (54) When I read your paragraph, I can interpret it to fit in exactly with my "mental model of reality" (with its physical and non-physical domains and with its non-physical mind(s)). I would interpret your "completion of the modeling process" to mean the expansion of my human, brain-limited, mentality so that it includes, or is subsumed by, all the non-physical mentalities that exist "reaching the topmost level". That "expansion" would be what I would understand as a "union with God". I see it sort of as a Vulcan Mind Meld from the old Star Trek. I would even agree with the last statement of the paragraph where you say "It's not only up to us". Here, I would interpret "us" to mean "us humans" and the inference is that it is not only up to us human minds, but it must also include the non-physical mind(s) as well. Now, you may not have meant your paragraph to mean anything like the way in which I interpreted it, but rather than simply saying that I agree, or that I disagree, with what you wrote, I tried to explain how what you wrote can be seen to fit into my personal mental model of reality.

110. (55) Your shortcut sounds like simple annihilation. And, yes, I would agree that would produce perfect balance forever. Although I don't think the idea is very useful, I guess it could happen. As for the reports of union with the divine, I would say that the feeling of omniscience would be a natural fallout of my model since the individual's conscious mind would be merged with, and thus be the same as, the higher level non-physical mind. They would also experience the extinction of their sense of self and all sensation as they pertained to the individual human body and brain. And you are right, with this merger, it would be less an answering of questions than the acquisition of the knowledge that makes the questions moot. So again, your paragraph is completely consistent with my personal mental model of reality, but it may not be consistent at all with what you had in mind when you wrote it.

111. (56) Here we disagree. I don't believe consciousness is an algorithm. As eloquently as Harv and Alex have argued to the contrary, they have made no impression on me whatsoever. I believe you can, in principle, write an algorithm to do all the things you say. You could build Alex's humanoid robot that could function undetected in human society and I would still say that it does not experience consciousness the way I do. I also think that Penrose ("The Emperor's New Mind", and "Shadows of the Mind") has demonstrated that this robot would also not be able to come up with imaginative proofs of theorems or other creative acts which humans are capable of. I don't deny the algorithms, and the complex physical network of logic that is a functional part of human mentality. I just maintain that the essence of consciousness transcends physical reality. Again, that is my fundamental disagreement with science. If you take the references to consciousness out of your paragraph 56 and just talk about the algorithms and the physical substrate, then I agree with everything you wrote there.

112. (57) Yes, I think there is something transcendent about music also. And, I think that whatever that is, it is indescribable.

113. (58) Your notion of "paranumbers" also makes sense to me. It seems to me that any "subconscious process which is even more abstract than numbers" would not be expressible in numbers and therefore would have to be a part of non-physical reality. Again, I see non-physical reality to be the domain of consciousness and things like the essence of music which are indescribable.

114. (59) You have exactly captured the correct mathematical notion of 'number'. And you are exactly right that "It's up to you to do the counting". But, here again is the mysterious personal pronoun. Who is the "you"? Well, we humans certainly can qualify; we have developed a considerable body of mathematics. But I maintain that there is another potential candidate for the "you", and that is the non-physical mentality that I keep bringing up.

115. (60-62) Your example of our ability to recognize composers from brief samples of their music is one of many such inexplicable capabilities of our minds. The ability to recognize faces is another one that is widely cited and studied. People have written programs to do pretty well at mimicking these abilities. But just as in the case of programs proving theorems, I think there is a threshold beyond which the human mind can go but which the algorithm-in-a-physical-machine cannot.

116. Along those same lines, the capability that baffles me is our ability to discern the direction in which the image of a human, or even an animal, is looking. Take virtually any picture, photo, painting, drawing, or even a cartoon of a person or an animal in virtually any posture, from any angle, and as long as a tiny part of the head is visible, you can tell at a glance where the person or animal is looking. You can tell if they are focused on the foreground or if they are staring off into the distance. You can tell if they are looking directly at you, or at something else. Just try it with a bunch of different pictures.

117. Now, imagine that you had to figure out an algorithm to examine the picture and determine where the subject of the picture was looking. I can't think of a harder programming assignment. Just look at some pictures and try to figure out exactly what clues you use to determine where the subject is looking. I can hardly ever find any specific clues for a single picture, much less a general set of clues that would work for many pictures. It just seems baffling to me that our minds can figure it out in an instant with no conscious reflection.

118. (63) Well Aurino, I have probably matched, or even exceeded, you in speculation. I think we both know better than to take it too seriously.

119. Before I close, let me try to knit all the things I said in my long introduction to the subjects you raised in your letter and to my responses. When we consider our attempts at communication, I think it is useful to distinguish between describable (physical) subjects and indescribable (non-physical) subjects. In a venue like counterbalance, the whole purpose is to force the two domains together in a single discussion. I think that is a good idea, and that it can be fruitful, but not unless we clearly understand and separate out the two domains.

120. If we stay completely within the physical, or describable domain, then we have ordinary life and we have mathematics and science. As long as we stay away from the more esoteric aspects of religion or music in our daily conversations, we get along pretty well. Math and science are the extreme examples, both in insisting on staying within the domain and in the success they have achieved in their communications. The rigid rules adopted by scientists and mathematicians strictly close off any consideration of anything from the non-physical domain. Those rules have been responsible, in my opinion, for their great success over the past couple centuries. I don't think they should change their rules.

121. If we stay completely within the non-physical, or indescribable domain, we can probably know and understand a lot, but I think Dick has shown that it is impossible to describe that knowledge in language. This clearly explains to me why all scripture is so vague, ambiguous, and misunderstood. It also explains why all important religious ideas are presented in allegories, parables, poetry, or other non-specific "descriptions". It explains why the "enlightened" come back out of their trances and tell the rest of us that what they know is indescribable and that the only way we can understand what they know is to try to experience it directly for ourselves.

122. Now, when we try to mix up the domains, like counterbalance does, or like you and I are attempting to do in this series of letters, or like science will have to do to address consciousness, I think we have to be careful. I think what is necessary in these contexts is first of all to always be clear as to which domain a particular concept is in, and secondly, to give up attempting to arrive at precise definitions or descriptions of "things" that are in the non-physical domain. It's sort of like the rules that apply to speculations in math or science. It's okay to talk about them as long as you don't use them as a basis for inference.

123. So, in summary, I would say that the problems inherent in the mixing of the two domains explains my difficulties in communicating on counterbalance, and they make my discussions with you and with Dick, hard to articulate. But, I hope that my explanation of how I see the big picture gives you a better idea of where I am coming from.

Warm regards,

Paul